(no title)

antonio jiménez-martínez

Associate Professor of Economics
Division of Economics
CIDE

I am an applied theorist with interest in uncertainty and information. My research focuses on information economics and social networks. Previously, I worked on optimality issues in general equilibrium models.

PAPERS

WORKING PAPERS

Evidence Acquisition and Concealment in Voting under Diverse Worldviews
(with Isabel Melguizo-Lopez)
Last Updated: February 2023

Persuasion under “Aspect-Restricted” Experimentation
Last Updated: January 2020

Persuading with Constrained Commitment and Soft Information
Last Updated: February 2022

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Making Friends: The Role of Assortative Interests and Capacity Constraints
(with Isabel Melguizo-Lopez)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, (2022), 203, 431-465

People make friends according to their assortative tastes while they are capacity constrained to sustain their friendship relations. Homophilic patterns arise together with good-quality heterophilic relations, and viceversa. Under certain conditions, friendship relations are asymmetrically supported. Efficiency is studied under homogeneous assortative tastes. Different populations sizes are important to ensure efficiency of stable patterns

Discrimination through Versioning with Advertising in Social Networks
Economic Theory, 2019, 73:3, 525-564

A platform sells a free version and a premium version of a service through a social network. The free version advertises another good and the premium version enhances the externalities of the services in the network. Following a classical demand-rotation mechanism, the platform second-degree discriminates consumers. Hazard rates determine optimal pricing and welfare implications are based on stochastic dominance of the degree of the network

Versioning and Advertising in Social Networks: Uniform Distributions of Valuations
Economics Bulletin, 2019, 39,1: 480-494

A platform sells a free version and a premium version of a service through a social network. The free version advertises another good and the premium version enhances the externalities of the services in the network. Close forms for the platform’s profits are derived when consumers have uniform distributions of valuations

On Information Aggregation and Interim Efficiency in Networks
Games, 2017, 8 (1), 15

Through a network, people listen to others’ opinions about a parameter. For beauty-contest preferences, the density of the network is crucial for welfare implications.

Identifying Defectors in a Population with Short-Run Players
(with Luciana Moscoso Boedo)
Economics Bulletin, 2015, 35,2: 1392-1403

In repeated Prisoners Dilemma interactions with long-lived and short-lived agents, a mechanism identifies defectors. Cooperation can be sustained under certain identification mechanisms, even under mechanisms which make identification mistakes.

A Model of Belief Influence in Large Social Networks
Economic Theory, 2015, 59: 21-59

People are engaged in a large network and listen to others’ opinions about a parameter. Unlike DeGroot naive learning model, people revise their opinions using a constrained form of Bayesian learning. Limiting beliefs can be characterized in terms of Entropy-based measures of signal structures. As in naive learning, consensus is bolstered in the presence of prominent agents, yet whose influence is limited

Information Acquisition Interactions in Two-Player Quadratic Games
International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, 43, 455-485

In two-player quadratic games, first-stage information acquisition choices condition second-stage action choices. Unlike Hellwing and Veldkamp (2009)’s model, transmission of the sort of strategic relationships from the information to the action choice needs not follow with a small number of players. Departing from the continuous-agent assumption implies essential changes in the mechanism underlying equilibrium of this sort of two-stage games

A Note on Bargaining over Complementary Pieces of Information in Networks
(with Kaniska Dam)
Economics Bulletin, 2012, 32, 4: 3098-3110

People bargain through a network about their complementary information using the classical Rubinstein’s model of alternating offers. For the star and line networks, the distribution of first-mover advantages within the network is related to the prices that result from the bargaining protocol

Dividend Paying Assets, the Unit Root Property, and Suboptimality
(with Subir Chattopadhyay)
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009, 45, 3-4: 223-232

In one-good OLG economies with uncertainty there exists a long-lived dividend paying asset. If the dividends are nonnegative, then the equilibrium asset prices can be related to the Perron root of the matrix of the agents’ intertemporal rates of substitution. When dividends are nonnegative, if the Perron root of some agent exceeds one, then the resulting allocation is suboptimal in a strong sense. Empirically identifiable properties of intertemporal rates of substitution help predict when social security systems fail to ensure efficient allocations

A Model of Interim Information Sharing under Incomplete Information
International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, 34: 425-442

Two players exchange first complementary pieces of information about a relevant state and then compete to predict the state. A compensation payment goes from lier to lied player. The incentives to reveal truthfully decrease with the amount of information that the player receives from the other so that information exchange features strategic substitution

Notes on the Suboptimality Result by J. D. Geanakoplos and H. M. Polemarchakis (1986)
Estudios Economicos, 2007, 22, 1: 111-136

A pedagogical alternative proof of the cornerstone result on suboptimality under incomplete asset markets by Geaneakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986)

BOOK CHAPTERS

Evolution of Beliefs in Networks under Bayesian Updating
in Emile Borel and the Notion of Strategy: 90th Anniversary (2014) El Colegio de Mexico Eds.